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"TO GUARD AGAINST THE UNFOUNDED
ACTIONS ... ."-THE ISSUE BEHIND
THE MENDEL LABELS
DONALD J. RAISON t
The holding in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.1 is that a
person injured by a product cannot sue the product manufacturer
under "strict liability in tort" if the accident occurred after the ex-
piration of the statute of limitations governing the right of the original
buyer to sue the manufacturer for breach of contract. The result in
Mendel was that the plaintiff was "time-barred from prosecuting a cause
of action before he ever had one," a result that the dissent viewed as
"all but unthinkable."2
Mendel is directly contrary to the decision of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Rosenau v. New Brunswick,3 which held that a strict
liability claim accrued at the time when the damage occurred, notwith-
standing the lapse of 22 years between the time the product left the
manufacturer's hands and the time of the damage.
Although Mendel appears to turn on the issue of whether a strict
liability claim should be labelled a contract or tort action, the root
causes of the split among the members of the New York Court of Ap-
peals extend well beyond the mere labelling of a cause of action.
The majority and minority both characterized the cause of action
as "strict liability in tort," but had widely disparate views concerning
the nature of such an action. Thus, the majority stated that
strict liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of priv-
ity are merely different ways of describing the very same cause
of action.4
Additionally, it indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
would govern a products liability case involving facts occurring after
the Code's effective date of September 27, 1964. 5
On the other hand, the minority stated that
strict liability in tort is itself a new doctrine although it has swept
the nation in extraordinarily rapid fashion.6
C A.B., Columbia University, 1951; LL.B., Columbia University, 1954.
125 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
2 Id. at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 211, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (dissenting opinion).
351 N.J. 120, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
4 25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.YS.2d at 494.
5 Id. at 342 n.1, 258 N.E.2d at 208 n.1, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 492 n.1.
6 Id. at 348, 253 N.E.2d at 212, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (dissenting opinion).
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As for the Uniform Commercial Code, it is all but irrelevant to
the problem at hand .... In short, the code does not purport to
provide an exclusive remedy but is confined to that in warranty
in the correct sense of that term.7
It is submitted that the minority is correct in recognizing strict
liability in tort as a "new doctrine." Writing in 1965 about New Jersey's
landmark strict liability cases," this author stated:
These two products liability cases were decided on the basis of the
new common-law principle of strict liability in tort instead of the
traditional theory of implied warranty. The doctrine of strict liabil-
ity in tort as enunciated in Santor and Schipper has added to the
law of products liability new concepts that in many respects render
outmoded the warranty aspects of products liability law as governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code. At the very least, it can be said
that the strict liability in tort principle gives New Jersey an in-
dependent body of products liability law paralleling article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in some respects, but in other respects
forging ahead, free and clear of the code. The purpose of this
article is to point out some of the similarities and contrasts between
this new tort doctrine and the Uniform Commercial Code and to
suggest some of the serious questions raised by the interplay of the
two bodies of law.9
The existence of two parallel bodies of products liability law is
fundamentally undesirable. Philosophically, there is the jurisprudential
question of whether courts should create a new common-law doctrine
when the legislature has only recently spoken on the same subject.10
In actual practice, as exemplified by Mendel, there is unwarranted
confusion and lack of certainty in an area of law that is becoming in-
creasingly important as society focuses more and more attention on the
problems of the consumer. 1
As might be expected with any new common-law doctrine, there
is no certainty as to its scope. Courts are handling the problems on a
case-by-case basis, with the result that there is little uniformity among
the decisions as to whether and to what extent a products liability case
7Id. at 341, 253 N.E.2d at 214, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (dissenting opinion).
8 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Santor v. A 9- M Karag-
heusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
9 Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between The Uni-
form Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuTGErs L. R a. 692, 693 (1965).
'Old. at 712-13.
l The American consumer, once docile and understanding, is on the rampage....
One of the growing problems in industry (and, consequently, for the insurance
business) is .... a growing awareness on the part of the consumer that he has
a right to expect the American manufacturer to turn out safe products.
Lawsuits by Consumers Put Pressure on Insurers in Product-Liability Area, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 5, 1970, at 55, col. 2.
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is governed by the UCC. Furthermore, there are fundamental incon-
sistencies even among those courts which unhesitatingly recognize that
they are espousing a new common-law doctrine.1 2 As a consequence,
there are great variations in the manner in which courts apply the
doctrine to routine types of products liability cases.
Given this confusion and uncertainty surrounding the doctrine,
the endeavor of the majority in Mendel to "contain" strict liability in
tort within the statutory strictures of the UCC is understandable. But
this approach merely postpones resolution of the problems.
The major area of confusion and uncertainty surrounding the doc-
trine involves the nature, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of the
proof required to sustain a strict liability in tort claim.
What is the burden of proof? A classic definition was given by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.:13
Under the strict liability in tort doctrine, as in the case of express
or implied warranty of fitness or merchantability, proof of the
manufacturer's negligence in the making or handling of the article
is not required. If the article is defective, i.e., not reasonably fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used,
and the defect arose out of the design or manufacture or while the
article was in the control of the manufacturer, and it proximately
causes injury or damage to the ultimate purchaser or reasonably
expected consumer, liability exists.14
The majority in Mendel would probably agree with this definition.
There is general agreement that the claimant is not required to prove
negligence, but must prove that the product had a defect attributable
to the manufacturer, which defect proximately caused the injury. There
is also general agreement that the product is not required to be "per-
fect,"1 and that "strict liability is not absolute liability."'16
Thus, the burden of proof is less than that in a negligence case, but
more than that required under an absolute liability doctrine. The cru-
cial question still remains: How "heavy" is this burden in actual prac-
tice?
12 Note the conflict between the Supreme Courts of California and New Jersey as to
whether the doctrine should be applied to a situation %vhere the plaintiff suffered only
economic loss or loss of bargain as distinguished from physical injury. Compare Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) with Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Note the New Jersey Supreme
Court's reaction in Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 134, 238 A.2d 169, 175 (1968).
13 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
14 Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313.
15 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326.
16 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d at 351, 253 N.E.2d at 214, 305.
N.Y.S.2d at 499 (dissenting opinion).
[VOL. 45:62
MENDEL
The minority in Mendel contended that the burden of proof is
"heavy rather than light," especially where "the passage of time has
the effect of making quite difficult the proof that the defect was due to
the manufacturer rather than to circumstances, passage of time, users,
and repairers of the product since sale and delivery."17 Is this contention
correct as a practical matter? The majority was not convinced, and in-
dicated that it was quite uneasy about this question when it concluded
its opinion as follows:
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious
claims that might arise after the statutory period has run in order
to prevent the many unfounded suits that would be brought and
sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum. Surely an injury re-
sulting from a defective product many years after it has been manu-
factured, presumptively at least, is due to operation and mainte-
nance. It is our opinion that to guard against the unfounded actions
that would be brought many years after a product is manufactured,
we must make that presumption conclusive by holding the contract
Statute of Limitations applicable to the instant action and limit
appellants to their action in negligence.18
The majority was well aware that negligence actions have been,
and will continue to be, brought against manufacturers for injuries
resulting from a defective product many years after it has been manu-
factured. In fact, in Mendel itself, the first two causes of action sounded
in negligence and were not involved in the decision, with the result
that the plaintiffs remained free to pursue their negligence claims.
Why then was the majority so disturbed with strict liability in
tort actions that it felt compelled to "guard" against "many unfounded
suits that would be brought and sustained against manufacturers...
many years after a product is manufactured"?19 One suspects that the
majority may have been manifesting an uneasy concern that the burden
of proof in strict liability in tort cases was not really "heavy," but was
actually much lighter than that in a negligence case-too much lighter
for its own liking.20
Is it easy or difficult to establish liability in a strict liability in tort
case? Initially, it is essential to note that unlike the typical tort case, the
product manufacturer is usually not present when the accident occurs
17 Id.
is Id. at 846, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.YS.2d at 495 (emphasis added).
19 Id.
20 But see Leach v. Wiles, 429 S.W.2d 828 (1968), which inexplicably states that strict
liability in tort "of course, places a much heavier burden of proof upon the purchaser
than does the rule which allows recovery by the purchaser from his immediate seller
under the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 882.
1970]
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in a products liability case. Hence, when a Mrs. Mendel claims that
she was struck by a glass door installed by Pittsburgh Plate Glass Com-
pany, or a Mrs. Henningsen claims that the steering wheel of her new
Plymouth spun in her hands just before her car veered off the highway
and crashed,21 or a Mrs. Newmark claims that the hair wave solution ap-
plied to her head by the beauty parlor operator gave her dermatitis
and caused her hair to fall out,22 the manufacturer is not usually in a
position to prove that the accident did not happen.
In such cases, the most the manufacturer can say is that the ac-
cident could not have happened in the manner claimed. This then
creates an issue of fact to be decided by the jury-usually a panel of
consumers. In this consumer-oriented society, a jury is not likely to
be sympathetic to a target defendant in the form of a large corporate
manufacturer, especially when it is obvious that the plaintiff has in fact
suffered some injury after using a product.
If the plaintiff testifies that the glass door struck her, or that the
steering wheel spun in her hands, or that her scalp became red and
blistered and her hair fell out, and the treating physician confirms the
injuries and testifies that the injuries proximately resulted from the
product, the defendant product manufacturer will be hard pressed to
convince the jury that the accident did not happen that way.
Must the plaintiff prove anything more? The cases hold that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the product was "defective.
23
How is this proven as a practical matter? What is a "defective" product?
The Mendel majority held that "strict liability in tort and implied
warranty in the absence of privity are merely different ways of describ-
ing the very same cause of action.12 4 Under this concept, a product that
is unmerchantable under section 2-314(2) of the UCC is "defective."
Goods not "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used"
are unmerchantable, 25 i.e., defective. Thus, the New York Court of
Appeals is in apparent agreement with the New Jersey Supreme Court's
statement in Santor, that a defective article is one "not reasonably fit
for the purposes for which such articles are sold."28
There is no requirement that "defect" be established by expert
testimony. Rather, the cases appear to say that the jury is permitted to
find that a product is "defective" when, based upon common knowledge
21 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
22 Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
23 See 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
24 See 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
25 UNIwoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2)(c).
26 See 44 N.J. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313.
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and the overall circumstances, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating
that an average user's reasonable expectations about the product's per-
formance have been disappointed.27 In Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc.,28 it
was held that the jury could infer that a hair-wave solution was defective
from the fact that the product was accompanied by an instruction in
the form of a warning which indicated that the product's use could ad-
versely affect an appreciable number of persons.
Defining "defective" products is the pivotal and crucial problem
in the law of products liability.29 Former Chief Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court, a creator of the strict liability in tort doc-
trine, has stated that "no single definition of defect has proved adequate
to define the scope of the manufacturer's strict liability in tort for physi-
cal injuries." 0
The nation's courts are just beginning to explore the problems
raised by the fluidity of this new criterion of "defect." An important
case worth noting on this vital question of what is a "defective product"
is Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital.31 There, the issue was whether a
commercial blood bank and a hospital may be held accountable on the
basis of strict liability in tort where they furnished blood containing
viral hepatitis which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The lower court
held that the blood was not "defective" under strict liability in tort
because the defendants were scientifically unable to prevent the pres-
ence of the harmful agent in the blood. However, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the case for a complete evidential
record which was to include
not only detailed testimony as to the nature of the defendants' op-
erations, but also expert testimony as to the availability of any test
to ascertain the presence of viral hepatitis in blood, the respective
incidences of hepatitis in blood received from commercial blood
banks and other sources .... 32
The significance of the remand in Jackson may lie in the fact that
the defendants were, in effect, required to come forth with evidence
27 1 R. HuPsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5A:6 (Supp. 1961).
28 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
29 The Restatement of Torts, one of the prime sources of law for the strict liability
doctrine, defines it as applying to the sale of "any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property." The comments thereto
offer helpful guidelines. According to comment i, the words "unreasonably dangerous" are
designed to limit "defect" by recognizing that "many products cannot possibly be made
safe for all consumption." RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A & comment i (1965).
8OTraynor, Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363, 373 (1965).
8196 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), rev'd, 53 N.J. 137, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
82 53 N.J. at 138, 249 A.2d at 67-68.
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that the blood was not "defective." Does this shift the burden of proof?
Does this portend a rule that once the claimant establishes an unin-
tended or unexpected result from the product, the manufacturer then
has the burden to prove that the product is not defective?
Courts accepting strict liability in tort as a socially desirable doc-
trine designed to compensate innocent consumers unexpectedly injured
by the use of "defective" products, may be heading toward such a rule.
A possible formulation is:
A consumer or ordinary user suffering unanticipated or unexpected
injury from the intended and proper use of a product is entitled
to be compensated for his damages, unless the manufacturer affir-
matively establishes that there was no way it could have foreseen
or avoided the possible injury. If the manufacturer could have fore-
seen the possibility of injury, it must then establish that it has
furnished adequate means for notifying and warning potential
users of this possibility and furnished adequate directions concern-
ing the use of the product in view of such possibility.
Under this standard, a plaintiff who establishes that he used a prod-
uct in an intended and proper manner, but suffered an unanticipated
and unexpected injury from such use, has made out a prima facie case
under strict liability in tort, and stands an excellent chance of obtaining
a verdict from a jury of consumers.
If this standard represents the direction in which courts are headed
in the application of the strict liability in tort doctrine, it is fair to con-
clude that as a practical matter, the burden of proof is really quite
"light." The majority in Mendel may well have sensed this direction
with apprehension. Accordingly, it enunciated a restrictive rule, even
though it conceded that such a rule would "sacrifice" meritorious
claims.83
The vital question is whether such a "sacrifice" is justified. The
majority's stated fear of, and need to "guard" against, "the many un-
founded suits that would be brought and sustained against manufac-
turers ... many years after a product is manufactured"3 4 seems to re-
flect a mistrust of society's ability, in the form of the jury, to arrive at
an objective and reliable determination that a plaintiff is or is not en-
tided to recover under the strict liability in tort doctrine.
The majority was "willing to sacrifice a small percentage of meri-
torious claims that might arise." 35What is the justification for sacrificing
33 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
34 Id.
s5 Id.
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any percentage of meritorious claims? The repose of a statute of limi-
tations against lawsuits is not a consideration because the manufacturer
still remains subject to negligence suits.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the major issue emerging from
Mendel is whether it is too easy, in this consumer-minded society, to
persuade a jury to render a strict liability in tort verdict against a prod-
uct manufacturer. Is this why the majority was willing "to sacrifice
the small percentage of meritorious claims" in order to "guard against"
the "many unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained against
manufacturers ad infinitum"?36
A jury trial may not be the best forum for resolving a products
liability claim. But a rule that arbitrarily deprives innocent and in-
jured consumers of a right to be compensated for damages is not the
solution.
One way or another, the needs of our consumer-oriented society
require some means of compensating innocent persons for avoidable
injuries resulting from products.37 If a jury trial is not the best forum
to award compensation, the system must be modified to provide a better
forum. It is no answer to say that the person has no remedy. Law must
serve society, and a rule of law that denies proper compensation does
not so serve, and cannot long stand.
86Id.
87 This need is being recognized by some lower courts. See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp.
v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 168, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1969) where
the court, in holding a retail installment sales contract unconscionable and unenforceable,
stated:
The establishment of the many departments of consumer affairs and consumer
protection bureaus as official agencies of our City, State and Federal government
and the enactment of truth in lending and truth in advertising legislation is
proof, if there need be any, of the recognition of the need to protect consumers,
even against their own improvidence.
Id. at 171, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
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